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The main view I argue for here is not entirely new. Myles Burnyeat (1999; cf.
2000,64) has already put forward a thesis much like mine, maintaining that for
Socrates and his interlocutors in the Republic, unless they demonstrate that the
aristocratic city they have built in speech is 'a practical possibility' in the sense
that'a reasonable approximation to it is a practical possibil i ty', the effort they
have put into describing this city will have been 'idle daydreaming, mere wish-
fulfilment' (300).1 Plus, there was some degree of precedent for Burnyeat's the-
sis even when he first articulated it.2 Nonetheless, he was right to say that the
repeated claim in the Republic to the 'practicability' of the aristocratic city had
'no t  been examined w i th  the  care  tha t  i s  due to  i t '  (1999,301;c i t ing375c-e ,
4 I 5c-d, 423d-424a, 425d-e, 450d, 452e-453c, 456c, 457 a, c, d-e, 458a, b, 466d,
4J I c-e, 47 2b-47 3b, 4J 3 c-e, 485 a, 499c-500e, 502a-c, 520e- 521 a, 5 40d, 592a) .
Focusing mainly on a set of different, related themes, he did not fully develop his
thesis about practicability. It was contentious enough, and since then it has been
heavily downplayed and even flatly rejected in some quarters.3 Annas 1999,80 is
unequivocal: 'There are passages [in the Republic] which make it clear that it is
of no importance whether the ideal state can exist or not' (cf. Blackburn 2006,
49). And other commentators talk either as if the practicability issue is of little or
no concern to Plato or as if it should be of little or no concern to us.a
Burnyeat, though, is basically correct: on Socrates and his interlocutors' terms,
a city built in speech is not the best polis unless it is practicable-or, as I shall put
I Whenever I mention the aristocracy or the aristocratic city in the context of a particular stage in
the Republic, I refer to kall ipolis under discussion in that stage of the dialogue. Otherwise I refer to
the kall ipolis described by the dialogue's end. All I ever mean by 'polit ical' in this essay is 'explicitly
about cities, including regimes'. All references to Plato's text are to Burnet's edition and translations
of the Republic are based on Bloom 1968.
2 Wonh consider ing are,  e.g. ,  Laks 1990; Reeve 1988, especia l ly  1101 Annas 1981, 185 (which
has to be v iewed in l ight  of  187,296);  Mol ine 1981,45-46,  White 1979, 152.
3  See ,  e .g . ,  Annas  1981 ,  181 ,296 ,  Gu th r ie  l 9 '75 ,451n l ,464-465 .469-410 ,483-486 ,  wh ich
includes a fair amount of other relevant bibliographical information. Perhaps like Annas l98l, 185
(on which see Laks 1990, 214), interpreters such as Demos 1957 , l66nl have taken the view that in
the Republic 'Plato vacil lates on the question whether his ideal state is capable of realization'.
a Schofield 2006,239 maintains that there is 'crystal clear' indication in the text that 'our focus'
in reading the Republic should be not on 'the issue of possibility or impossibilit,-' but on 'the idea of
community (koin1nia)' -the idea'that sharing is what makes a city a real or a good city'. Brown
2000, 14 holds that in the dialogue 'actual feasibil ity' is ultimately presented as 'an unimportant con-
cen (472d2)' (though perhaps by 'actual feasibility' Brown should be taken to mean something like
'attainability here and now within a particular society').
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it, possible.5 To be sure, Socrates and his interlocutors shift somewhat at 472b3-
4i3b3. Prior to that passage, they talk as if the aristocratic city is possible if and
only if it could come to be (or, exist)-in other words, if and only if it could be
replicatecl in the phenomenal world. And after 412b3-473b3, they talk as if the
aristocratic city described before that passage is possible if and only if it could be
(at least) approximated closely enough in the phenomenal world-that is, if and
only if a similar enough city could come to be, even if the original polis itself
could not. But at any rate, insofar as they argue for the justice of the aristocratic
city, an integral part of the task they take up is to show that there could be a close
enough phenomenal approximation to the original polis.
Granted, in one respect Socrates and his interlocutors' claim that there could be
such an approximat ion is more modest than we might suppose at  f i rst .  As
Burnyeat 1999,306-307 correctly notes, they make their claim 
'not with a view
to what could be done in Athens or Syracuse, tomorrow or the day after, but from
a standpoint of both temporal and geographical neutrality' (307 ; see, e.g., 502b I -
3). Accordingly, the claim is not that the requisite approximation is attainable for
some particular society,6 but simply that there could be a close enough phenome-
nal approximation somewhere sometime. In other words, what they must argue
successfully is that an approximation of that sort is not precluded by a certain set
of constraints, namely, either the constraints of the phenomenal world or the con-
junction of the constraints of the phenomenal world and the constraints imposed
by the immortal soul, meaning the psuche which survives the death of the human
body.7 In claiming that a close enough approximation could come to be, Socrates
and his interlocutors do not commit themselves to saying that any particular
political proposal voiced in the Republic is worth trying to put into practice, at
least anytime soon. There would be no inconsistency in making their claim about
possibility while also maintaining, for example, that the makeup of every society
in the foreseeable future will preclude a close enough phenomenal approxima-
tion.
Yet Socrates and his interlocutors do take on the task of arguing that there
s Whenever I  say 'on Socrates and his inter locutors ' terms,p is  the case' ,  a l l  I  mean is that
Socrates and his interlocutors treet p as true, talking as t' p is the case; whenever I say that they talk
as if p is the case, what I mean is that they are awere that they talk that way. When I say that Socrates
and all his interlocutors in the Repubtic agree with each other on a particular view or argument, all I
mean is that after one character claims or implies that a particular view is true or that a particular
argument is sound, either none of the characters ever voices any reservations about it or every charac-
ter who does voice reservations ends up voicing his assent and never retracts it.
6 And of course. neither does the claim concern how likell- it is that a close enough phenomenal
approximation will come to be (cf., e.g.,502c6-7,540d2-3).
7 Presumably, the constraints of the immortal soul are also included if in the Republic the
immortal soul is supposed to contain not only reason but also spiritedness and appetite. I mean to take
no position on the issue of whether it is (on which see Lorenz 2006, 36-38 and Gerson 2003, esp. 124'
131). Burnyeat 1999,306 can seem to mean that the constraints of human nature are the only con-
straints at issue in the conversation between Socrates and his interlocutors. But at the least (even in
light of 456b12-cl and 485a4-8; see Burnyeat 1999,306 with 306n17; cf. White 1979,142), presum-
ably Socrates and his interlocutors would say in effect that the laws of physics also matter.
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could be such an approximation somewhere sometime. And that has considerable
implications for a relatively wide range of interpretations of the Republic, as I
will underscore in the final section. My aim here is to take a much closer look
than any available at the issue of possibility in the Republic, and to show that
Socrates and his interlocutors act in accordance with what I shall call the possi-
bility requirement: A polis built in speech is not the best city unless it is possible.
I. The Possibility Requirement Prior to 412b3-413b3
Commentators uch as Schofield 2006, 239, Brown 2000, 14, and Annas 1999,
80 deny that the possibility of the aristocratic city is an integral concern in the
Republic. Their denial is based on an appeal to Republic 412b3-413b3 and
592a1-b6. Apparently, these commentators would say that if possibility plays a
significant role in the dialogue prior to 412b3-473b3, Socrates and his interlocu-
tors sabslantially change direction at that point in a way that renders possibility
irrelevant. I think it is incorrect to hold that the issue of possibility drops out after
412b3-413b3, and I will argue as much in the next section below. But first I want
to show that prior to 472b3-413b3, the possibil i ty requirement is, indeed, in
place.
To begin with, consider the context in book 5 in which 472b3-413b3 appears.
At the start of book 5, Socrates' interlocutors interrupt him. They protest that he
has not adequately supported his claim that the aristocratic city that he and they
have built in speech is the just polis. Effectively conceding, Socrates quickly
confesses that 'it's not easy' (a50c6) to fill out the argument fully enough. And
as if to explain why is conceding , he highlights the question of whether the aris-
tocratic city is possible-meaning, at this point, whether it could come to be
despite the constraints of the material realm or also the constraints of the immor-
tal soul-and he talks as if the account given so far in the dialogue has a serious
problem if the city, in fact, could not come to be: 'For it could be doubted that the
things said are possible (6uvord); and even f in the best possible conditions they
could come to be (y6votro), that they would be what rs best (frptot') will also be
doubted. So that's why there's a certain hesitation about getting involved in it,
for fear that the argument might seem to be a prayer (etXn), my dear friend'
(450c8-d2).8 Socrates soon agrees to 'go back again and say what perhaps should
8 At 472a8-b2,e.g.,Glaucon pressures Socrates to tell 
'how itis possible for this regime to come
to be (nfi 8uvatil yipeo0rxr crrjtn i rol"rteto)'; at 412d2 and d7 respectively, Socrates similarly uses
the phrases 8uvcrrd tcr0tu y iyveo0crt  ( 'possib le for  these th ings to come to be' )  and 8uvatbv
yev6o0at roroOtov &v8pa ('possible for such a man to come to be'); and he tells Glaucon at 413a7'
bl: 'If we're able to find how a city might be managed most closely to what's been said, say that
we've found the possib i l i ty  o. f  these th ings'  coming to be on which you insist  (6uvatd tcr0tcr
ytpeoOcn ii of enrtdrterg)' . That strongly suggests that up to roughly 473ai -b3 in the conversation,
the issue about possibil ity is about whether the city under discussion could come to be. Accordingly,
unless there is good reason to think that the talk of possibil ity in that part of the dialogue is about
something else instead, the most sensible conclusion is that that is what it concerns. On another point,
at 457d8-9, too, it is Socrates who makes the distinction between whether a certain way of structuring
the polis would be best and whether it would be possible, and when Glaucon at 4'7lc4-e5 demands
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have been sardthen in i ts turn ' (451b9-cl ;cf .  h is confession at5O2d4-8).  There-
upon, he and Glaucon agree to investigate first whether it is possible, and then
whether i t  is  best,  to structure the pol is in the ways Socrates has proposed
(452e4-453a6; cf. 456c4-10), for example, whether it is possible to have women
exercise naked with men in the palaestras.  The conversat ion then proceeds
accordingly. Glaucon ends up consenting that when it comes to the prospect of
having female guardians who share all pursuits with the male guardians, 
'we
weren't giving laws that are impossible (u6rivcxrd) or l ike prayers (eriXatq)'
(456b12). And perhaps most revealing, he also assents that nothing is 
'better 
for
a city than the coming to be in it of the best possible (rbq crptotouq) women and
men' (456e6- l ;  cf . ,  e.g. ,  416c7 with 428d12, though also,  e.g. ,  421c1-2);  that
what he and Socrates have just discussed would ensure the production of such
women and men; and that that law 'is therefore not only possible, but also best'
(ou  pr6vov  dpcr  6uvotbv  d I Id  rc r i  dprorov ,45Ja3) .  As  i t  shou ld  be  c lear
enough, Socrates and his interlocutors talk here as if a particular way of structur-
ing a city (or a city structured in that way) has to be possible in order to be best
(cf., e.g., B6l"rtotcx, einep 8uvard, 
'best, provided fthat it 's] possible' ,at502c2)
That is, Socrates and his interlocutors adhere to the possibility requirement.
And that is perfectly in keeping with all the passages in the dialogue that pre-
cede this passage. In that whole stretch of the dialogue, Socrates and his inter-
locutors never seek a political order that is ideal by virtue of the Forms alone, and 
\'
their search for the ideal political order is always guided by empirical considera-
tions.e Even at the very outset of the discussion of good cities, after Socrates has
said: 'Come, now, let's make a city in speech from the beginning' (369c9-10),
the first thing he goes on to say is: 
'Well, now, the first and greatest of needs is
the provision of food for existing and living' (369d1-2).In a phenomenal city,
people need food, there are children who can be corrupted by corruptive poetry,
faction can arise, and so on. And perhaps if there is, indeed, a paradigm (or,
model, napd8etylrcr) of the just city laid up in heaven, as Socrates says at 592b2-
3 there might be-and if paradigms of that sort are (in one way or another) dis-
t inct  f rom Forms, as one can cogent ly argue they are (see Burnyeat 1999,
291-299: cf. Dorter 2006,302-304, Ferrari 2003, 105-106)-the paradigmatic
just city also suffers similar complications. But on Socrates and his interlocutors'
terms, it would be a proper standard by which to measure the justice of phenom-
enal cities only insofar as it accurately represented the Forms. And there is no
need for food, for example, among Forms. One considers such needs in this con-
that Socrates Jinally address the feasibility of what has been proposed, what Glaucon alludes to is the
point earlier in the conversation (451eT-458b7) at which Socrates-unlike on previous occasions-
asks Glaucon to let him set aside for a moment the question of possibil ity.
e This is the case in spite of, e.g., 532a6, Phaedo 65e8-66a1 . I recognize that Socrates has not yet
introduced overt talk of the Forms in this stage of the dialogue. I make the point here above simply in
case this part of the conversation is to be read in light of the parts in which overt talk of the Forms
does appear. Note, Annas 1981,234 claims that' in Books 5 and l0 Forms are brought in as being
already accepted by all the interlocutors, though they are new to the reader. The same happens at
-505a with the Form of the Good'.
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text only if one is trying to determine what is possible given the constraints of the
phenomenal realm or also the immortal soul.
Moreover, if a city does not have to be possible in order to be best, then to
shape a paradigmatic city in light of those constraints is to misshape it; for in that
case, the proper paradigm of the best city might be simply the best ctty c'onceiv-
able. As long as it is genuinely best, the best city conceivable can be purely fan-
tastical in every other respect. A wide range of counterfactual states of affairs are
readi ly conceivable (Superman, Homeric and Hesiodic gods-anything but
square circles). Plus, anything or anyone conceivable can be built in speech. If,
for example, citizens must have needs in order for a city to be founded and be
cohesive (369b5-8), Socrates and his interlocutors could satisfactorily describe a
polis in which everyone requires only, say. a chance to love other people and be
loved in return. And if any constraints at all are imposed by the phenomenal
realm or also the immortal soul, the best conceivable city is sure to be better, so
to speak, than the best possible city.
In any case, in th is whole stage of  the dialogue-from the point  at  which
Socrates and his interlocutors start to build a city in speech, and up to roughly
413a7-b3-they talk as if the bestpolis is the envisioned city that has the most
preferable, beneficial, or advantageous features that a phenomenal city could
have: on Socrates and his interlocutors' terms here, a city built in speech is best
only if it could be replicated in the phenomenal world. For that matter, they not
only proceed as if they have to meet the possibility requirement but also they do
so quite conspicuously, and in the Republic as a whole this requirement plays a
major role in shaping their conversation. In much of the Republic, they work
assiduously to build a regime capable of performing the functions they ascribe to
the aristocratic city, and Socrates and his interlocutors tweak one aspect after
another of the aristocracy. In book 2,they end up saying that the feverish city
needs more craftsmen than the healthy city needed, and more land and, thus,
guardians, and that the guardians need to be philosophic in nature (373b-376c).
The question becomes how properly to educate the guardians so that they will be
both gentle enough with people in the city and suitably ferocious toward enemies
outside the city (see 416a2-d4). The vast majority of the conversation at 369d1-
427c5 has to do with how the potential guardians could be shaped into suitable
rulers. And in book 5, after Glaucon ends up agreeing to search for the closest
approximation to the ideal city, the conversation virlually returns to the question
of whether there could be suitable rulers of the aristocratic city, and it then
lingers on that question through the end of book 7.
II. Is the Possibility Requirement Cancelled at 412b3-473b3?
I have argued that the possibility requirement is in place prior to 412b3-473b3.
But certain commentators would say that a substantial shift occurs at 472b3-
473b3 that reverses whatever role the possibility issue played up to that point in
the dialogue. They suppose that the possibility requirement is in effect cancelled
at 412b3-473b3, and in the subsequent discussion possibility is irrelevant. The
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case for this view appears bolstered by the claim at 592a7 -b6. So let me address
those two passages.
At 592a1-b6, Socrates and his interlocutors seem to agree with each other that
the ar istocrat ic i ty 'has i ts place in speeches'and is 'nowhere on earth ' (a l l ) ,
and that probably (b6) 
'it doesn't make any difference whether [that city] is or
wi l l  be somewhere' in the phenomenal wor ld (b3-4).  And at473a7-b2, whi le
insist ing that the aim should be simply to draw in speech an appropr iate
paradigm (ncrpdSetypa) against which to measure the justice of particular men
and cities in the phenomenal world, Socrates declares:
If we're able to find how a city might be managed most closely
to what 's been said,  say that we've found the possibi l i ty  of
these things'  coming to be on which you insist  (edv oloi  te
yevripeOcx e'bpetv rbq &v eyyr5tcxra t6v eipqp6vrrlv n6l,tg oirt'1-
ottsv, gdvut np&q e(nupnrdvcxt rbq 6uvcxtd, tcxOta /yveo0crr
ii of frutrdrterg). Or won't you be satisfied if it turns out this
way? I, for my part, would be satisfied.
Glaucon replies that so would he (473b3), and no one else objects. It might seem
that here the possibil i ty requirement is effectively cancelled-in other words,
that Socrates and his interlocutors substantially change direction at this point,
now simply rejecting the view that a city or a way of structuring it has to be pos-
sible in order to be best. The thought would be that on their terms after 473a7-b3,
the point is just to describe the best conceivable city, and the best phenomenal
city is simply the one that most fully resembles it, whatever phenomenal city that
might turn out to be (see Schofield 2006 ,239). Taking up that thought, we might
say that if the Republic concerns politics at all, instead of just the soul, perhaps
the purpose of looking to a paradigm of justice is simply to make a democracy or
some other non-aristocratic phenomenal regime as much like the paradigmatic
aristocracy as possible.
To the contrary, I claim that rather than being cancelled, at 413a7 -b3 the possi- .
bility requirement is only adjusted somewhat and is effectively left intact. Even
after 473aJ-b3,on Socrates and his interlocutors'terms a city is best only if it is -
possible, so in part we are to look to the phenomenal world in gauging whether a
paradigm drawn in speech is the right standard of justice. The point at472b3-
413b3, I maintain, is simply that the appropriate test of possibility is not whether
there could be a phenomenal replica of the city they have built in speech.l0 On
my view, Socrates and his interlocutors proceed after 472b3-413b3 as if it has to
be feasible to originate a sfficiently similar city: unless a standard could be
approximated closely enough in the phenomenal world, the standard is not the
appropriate paradigm of justice.r' My view might seem surprising. Why is it
clear enough that the possibility requirement is not in fact cancelled at 413a7 -b3?
r0 For why it is plain enough that possibil i ry' is what is to be tested, see, e.9., 4'72e8, 473a7 -bl ,
502c2,540d3, 541b8.
I I As I mention in the final section below, it is not clear just how close of an approximation is
close enouph on Socrates and his interlocutors' terms.
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Note first that on its own 592a7-b6 is relatively ambiguous. It canbe read to
have a much more modest meaning than we might suppose. The claim that the
aristocratic city 'has its place in speeches' and is 
'nowhere on earth' (al I ) can be
read to mean simply that no such polis exists at present-and not that no such
city could ever come to be. And with regard to the claim that probably (b6)'it
doesn't make any difference whether [that city] is or will be somewhere' in the
phenomenal world (b3-4), we can say the point is not that the feasibility or infea-
sibility of that city is immaterial simpliciter,but that even if the aristocratic ity is
impossible it can still be of use to the man whom Socrates and Glaucon discuss at
59lc-592b-the intelligent man who works toward the proper development of
his soul and, accordingly, wants to found within himself a city l ike the aristo-
cratic polis (cf .592b2-3).
By itself the flexibil i ty of 592a1-b6 does not count for much. But in l ight of
certain other features of the dialogue, 592a7-b6 needs to be interpreted along the
more modest l ines just mentioned. If after 413a7-b3 the point were simply to
favor the phenomenal city that most fully resembles the paradigm (whatever city
it might turn out to be), then it would be difficult to account for how Socrates'
statement at 4l3al-bl begins: 
'lf we're able to find how a city might be managed
most closely to what's been said, say that we've found the possibil i ty of these
things' coming to be on which you insist.' Socrates seems to talk as if there still
will be atest of possibility. And what value can a test have here unless Socrates
and his interlocutors take up the task of establishing that there could be a phe-
nomenal city similar enough to the city built in speech? Inevitably, some phe-
nomenal city or cities would be more similar than other phenomenal cities are
(and thus'closes/'to the paradigm). Plus, unless the task is to show that a phe-
nomenal city could be similar enough, it also is difficult to account for what hap-
pens next in the dialogue. At473b4-cl, Socrates and Glaucon agree that now
they must try to establish what it would take for the closest approximation to
come to be, and part of what they then go on to discuss at considerable length is
whether too much is required (see, e.g. ,541a8-bl) .
If the possibility requirement were cancelled at 413a7 -b3, then in telling Glau-
con at 473a8-bl: 'Say that we've found the possibility of these things' coming to
be on which you insist', Socrates would mean: 
'Just forget about whether they're
possible. It doesn't matter.' But if that were what he meant, it would be strange
that he indicates at 472e6-9 that he is going to try to demonstrate (ono6ei(at, e7)
possibil i ty; and it would be no less odd that at 540d-541b, at the close of the
phase of  d iscussion that immediately fo l lows 4l3al-b3, he gets Glaucon to
affirm that at that point possibility has been argued for cogently enough. Plus,
540d-541b fits with a number of references to possibility that appear between
473a1-b3 and 540d-541b. Perhaps most striking is the phrase B6l,trotcr, tinep
8uvcrtd at 502c2.
In starting his statement at 472e6-9 by saying: 
'If, then, to gratify you I must
also strive to prove how and under what condition it would be most possible' ['to
found a city the same as the one in speech' ,472e4], Socrates might seem to sug-
t8
gest that possibility is to be demonstrated only for the purpose of gratifying Glau-
con - in other words, that Socrates will put Glaucon's concerns to rest simply for
the sake of going the extra mile. And in light of 412b7-e\-that is, the passage
leading up to 472e6-9- it might look as if Socrates is just particularly accommo-
dating here. We might think that already at 472b7-e5-even putting aside 473a7-
b 3 - h e  e f f e c t i v e l y  g e t s  G l a u c o n  t o  a g r e e  t h a t  p o s s i b i l i t y  n e e d  n o t  b e
demonstrated.
But f irst, hke 592a7-b6 discussed above, on its own 412b7-e5 is relatively
ambiguous. Although 412b1-e5 can be read in the way I just pictured, it surely
does not have to be read that way. The claims at 4l2bl-c3 and 412e3-5 can be
legitimately seen as consistent with the view that a city built in speech is not best
unless it could be approximated closely enough in the phenomenal world. At
412b1-cl, all Socrates asks Glaucon is: ' If we discover what sort of thing justice
is, wil l we also insist that the just man must not differ at all from justice itself
(ourfrq ereivrlq) but be in every lr,al,' such as it is (ncrvtaXfr toto0tov e?ucr, oiou
8rraroorivrl iottv)?' Socrates uses similar language at 412e3-4 when he refers to
the possibi l i ty  of  founding a c i ty ' the same as the one in speech'  (or i tco. . . rbq
t)"tyerc,412e4).r2 And especially in light of that (and partly since 412d4-7 picks
up on the idea pervading 412c4-d3 of a ncrpdberypra), when Socrates asks at
472d4-7 ,'Do you think any less of a painter who draws a paradigm of what the
fairest human being would be l ike and renders everything in the picture ade-
quately but can't prove that it 's also possible for such a man to come to be?', it
makes plenty of sense to think Socrates means that what the painter cannot prove
the possibility of is a man of exactll,- that sort. By virtue of that, what Glaucon
effectively affirms at 472d8 can be seen as consistent with the view that a city
buitt in speech is not best unless it could be approximated closely enough in the
phenomenal world.
By itself the flexibil i ty of 412b1-e5, l ike that of 592a1-b6, is hardly decisive.
But 412b1-e5 needs to be interpreted in the way I just suggested, for there is a
compel l ing reason to deny that in that  passage Glaucon is led to assent hat
demonstrating possibil i ty is unnecessary. If Socrates and his interlocutors can-
celled the possibility requirement at any stage within 412b3-413b3, it would be
hard to explain their behavior in the whole rest of the dialogue. For if a city does
not have to be possible in order to be best, then the city built in speech prior to
472b3-413b3 should be scrapped entirely. After all, as I have emphasized, from
the point at which Socrates and his interlocutors first start to build a city in
r2 Strictly speaking the claims at412c4-d3 can be legitimately seen as consistent even with the
view that a city built in speech is not best unless it could be replicated in the phenomenal world. At
412c4-d3, Socrates gets Glaucon to assent hat the point of the search so far-the search for'what
justice by itself is l ike' and 'the perfectly just man, if he should come into being, and what he should
be like once he came into being; and in their turns, for injustice and the most unjust man'-has been
to find a paradigm, rather than to prove the possibil ity of the city built in speech. And even if doing X
is not the point of carrying out a particular task-i.e.. even if doing X is not that for the sake of which
the task is carried out-it can still be necessary for carrying out that task successfully.
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speech in book 2, and up to 412b3-473b3, they shape their city in light of what
they think the constraints of the phenomenal world or also the immortal soul are.
In the absence of the possibility requirement perhaps all they should describe is
the best city conceivable.
Yet plainly enough, after 472b3-473b3 Socrates and his interlocutors hardly
scrap everything said before then about what the just city is. On the one hand,
from passages uch as 473b4-cl , 540d 1-3, and 541a8-b I , it is evident enough
that the topic that Socrates and his interlocutors start to discuss with each other at
473c2 is the'closest'approximation to the original aristocratic city (meaning the
aristocratic city described prior to 472b3-413b3) allowed by the constraints of
the phenomenal realm or also the immortal soul (that is, the city referred to at
473a7-8 as the closest approximation). On the other hand, on Socrates and his
interlocutors' terms the most substantial difference between the closest approxi-
mation and the original aristocratic city is simply that the closest approximation
is explicitly said to have rulers who are philosophers. The clearest testament o
that is the fact that in book 6, well after 412b3-473b3, when Socrates refers to the
regime within the closest approximation, Glaucon asks 
'whether it 's the same
one we described in founding the crty' (497c5-6), and Socrates replies that 
'it's
the same in the other respects and in this very one, too, which was stressed in
connection with it-that there would always have to be present in the city some-
thing possessing the same logos of the regime as you, the lawgiver, had when
you were setting down the laws' (497c7-d2). The exchange that then follows
makes it evident enough that on Socrates and his interlocutors' terms the most
substantial addition to the conversation is simply the explicit talk of philosopher-
kings. Perhaps the closest approximation is numerically distinct from the aristo-
cratic city described prior to 412b3-473b3, as 543c7 -544b4 can seem to suggest
it is. Perhaps, instead, in line with what 497d4 can seem to suggest, the conversa-
tion that follows 472b3-473b3 simply explicates a certain feature of the aristo-
cratic city that it already had (contrast, e.g., Brown 2003, $4.1 with Reeve 1988,
170, 172, l86ff .). But whether one city is replaced with another or, instead, the
difference is just between what is explicitly said before 412b3-413b3 and what is
explicitly said thereafter, on Socrates and his interlocutors' terms the shift is far
from radical, despite how consequential it is.
I should add that even after 412b3-413b3 Socrates and his interlocutors never
voice any doubt that the city should perform the functions that they as early as
book 2 assumed it should perform (for example, the shaping children's educa-
tion and rearing so that there will be rulers ferocious enough toward the city's
enemies but sufficiently gentle with its citizens) or that in order to perform those
functions the city needs to have the features they name prior to 472b3-473b3,
such as the sharing of women and children. The point of adding philosopher-
kings into the equation is to ensure that the city can perform those functions by
those means (see 423e4-6; cf . Schofield 1999,37). After all, the official aim of
the discussion that runs from 473c2 through the end of book 7 is simply to estab-
lish that there could come to be a city in which women and children were
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shared.l3 Plus, the overarching claim made within the discussion running from
473c2 through the end of book 7, where Socrates and his interlocutors agree that
the aristocratic city is possible, is that philosopher-rulers could come to be (and
that once they came to power they would exile everyone else over the age of ten
and rear the remaining children 'far away from those dispositions they have now
from their parents' ,540e5-541b1). Presumably, the reason that the feasibility of
philosopher-rulers is supposed to translate into the feasibility of sharing women
and children is that philosopher-rulers would decide that women and children
would be shared (and philosopher-rulers would not face too much resistance in
acting on that decision).
III. What Rides on Whether the Closest Approximation Could Come to Be?
It is significant that Socrates and his interlocutors adhere to the possibility
requirement throughout the Republic, for on their terms, if they are to argue that
the aristocratic city is the just polis, they need to argue successfully that the clos-
est approximation could come to be. More specifically, the extent to which they
support their claim about what justice is in the polis depends crucially on the
extent to which they support the claim that the closest approximation could come
to be, and they support the former claim only if they support the latter claim.
Granted, perhaps a city can be just even if it is neither possible nor best; and
for all we know, Socrates and his interlocutors would say that it can be. Although
they proceed as if a city has to be possible in order to be best, tt is not clear that
on their terms a city has to be possible in order to be just: we are left only to
guess whether they would say it does. And they also never claim that a city has to
be best in order to be just.la
Further, the aristocratic city might be possible even if the closest approxima-
r3 As evidence: (l) Part of what Socrates and his interlocutors agree at 543a1-c4 is that a city is
'governed on a high level' only if it is a polis in which women and children are in common. (2) This
aspect of 543a1-c4-coupled with 458b8, where Glaucon consents when Socrates proposes to talk
first about the advantageousness of sharing women and children, before talking about its possibility-
suggests that at 47 1c4-e5 Glaucon is content enough that sharing women and children is best pro-
vided thut it is possible: its possibil ity is the one remaining issue there in the current phase of the
conversation. Plus, (3) when Glaucon presses that issue at4llc4-e5, Socrates soon agrees to try to
demonstrate possibil ity.
ra We might understandably assume that they would make that claim. In book 4 they seem to
agree that the just polis is a city in which each citizen performs strictly the function for which he is
naturally fit (see esp.433a5ff.); and it certainly is tempting to think that on Socrates and his interlocu-
tors' terms the best state of affairs is simply one in which everything does its proper ergon and
thereby accords with nature. Yet there plainly are cases in which Socrates and his interlocutors talk as
if accordance with nature is not a sufficient condition of bestness. E.g., at 456c9-10-just after Glau-
con has virtually affirmed again that the laws Socrates has proposed are possible because thelt accord
with nature (456c1-8; cf.456bl2-cl)-Socrates gets him to consent also that since they have now
decided that those laws are possible, nert they must consider a dffirent question-viz., whether those
laws are best (B6l"tror,a,456c9). Admittedly, what Socrates and Glaucon mean at 456c9-10 in speak-
ing of accordance with nature might be different from what they mean at 444d3-12. But perhaps it is
the same.
8 1
t ion could not come to be; and for al l  we know, i f  someone were to show
Socrates and his interlocutors that it could not, they might still argue that the aris-
tocratic city is possible. One reason is that it is not clear just how much like an
or ig inal  c i ty an approximat ion supposedly has to be in order to resemble i t
'enough'; the Republic affords no firm answer. Though, for example, we can
rightly say that Socrates and his interlocutors proceed as if the original aristo-
cratic city (meaning, again, the aristocratic city described prior to 472b3-473b3)
is possible as long as the closest approximation could come to be, we would go
beyond what the Republic gives us if we made the additional claim that on their
terms the original aristocratic city is possible only if the closest approximation
could come to be.
And here is another reason. First, they end up treating the closest approxima-
tion as the best city (that is, as the best possible city), though Laks 1990,215-216
talks as if they do not. Of course in this context one expects an approximation to
be less desirable than what it approximates. Plus, (1) at f irst, such as at4J3a7-b3,
the candidate for the best city is the original aristocratic polis; (2) at 473a1-b3
Socrates and his interlocutors agree that the original aristocratic city is possible if
it could be approximated closely enough in the phenomenal world; (3) by 413c2
their agreement effectively is to build in speech a polis similar to the original
aristocratic city (in other words, the agreement is to approximate the original
aristocratic city in speech) and to investigate whether the newer city could be
replicated in the phenomenal world;15 and (4) by at least 543d they have agreed
that the closest approximatron could come to be. But at 49lb1ff . Socrates refers
to the political order within the closest approximation as 
'the best regime' (ti'1v
cxpiotr1v nol"rtetav). And at 543d1-544a1Glaucon says that the closest approxi-
mation seems to be 'still finer' than the original aristocratic city.
I take no position on whether the closest approximation is supposed to be
numerically identical to the original aristocratic city. But if it is, then in effect
Socrates and his interlocutors' claim about possibil i ty is ult imately this: The
original aristocratic city could be not just approximated closely enough in the
phenomenal world, but replicated there. And if the closest approximation is sup-
posed to be numerically distinct from the original aristocratic city, then in effect
Socrates and his interlocutors' claim is ultimately this: Regardless of whether the
original aristocratic city could be approximated closely enough in the phenome-
nal world, a certain preferable aristocratic city could be replicated there. So
either way, regarding the aristocratic city which by the end of the dialogue they
treat as the best polis,their claim is that it is possible because it could come to be.
And for all we know, perhaps they would say that that claim is stronger than it
has to be. Since, to repeat, at413al-b3 they agree that the original aristocratic
l5  The issue is  not  whether the c losest  approximat ion could i tsel f  be approximated c losely
enough in the phenomenal world. And that is appropriate, after all, since the original aristocratic city
could be approximated closely enough in the phenomenal world only if a sufficiently similar phe-
nomenal city could come to be. So, in l ight of 473a7-b3 and 540d-541b, the 8uvatri at502c2 is most
sensibly read as meaning 
'could come to be'.
82
city is possible even if it could just be approximated closely enough in the phe-
nomenal world, we are left to think that if they came to the conclusion that the
closest approximation could not come to be they might say it still is possible as
long as ir could be approximated closely enough in the phenomenal world: we
are left to think they might say that, as a general principle,whatever the best city
turns out to be it is possible as long as there could be (at least) a close enough
phenomenal approximation to it.r6
In any case, I acknowledge that if someone were to show them that the closest
approximation could not come to be, perhaps they would say, 
'No matter-the
just city is still is what we've said it is' and then go on to give an argument for
that claim. Nonetheless, here it scarcely matters whether they would, for no such
argument appears in the dialogue. In fact, (l) Socrates and his interlocutors infer
the aristocratic city's justice from its bestness. Part of what they explicitly agree
at 427e10-12 is that since the aristocratic city is 
'completely good' (tel"6roq
aya0iv) it must be just. And they do not argue that the aristocratic city is just
even if itis not best-the only relevant case they make for the aristocratic city's
justice is that the aristocratic city is the best polis; so unless they argue success-
fully that it is best, they fail to argue successfully that it is just. (2) In the absence
of the possibility requirement, perhaps all they should describe is the best city
conceivable. And (3) their argument that the closest approximation could come
to be is the only relevant case they ultimately make in trying to meet the possibil-
ity requirement. Hence on their terms, the extent to which they support the claim
about what justice is in the polis depends quite heavily on the extent to which
they support the claim that the closest approximation could come to be-so heav-
ily that if the case they make for the latter claim happened to collapse, so would
all their support for the former claim.
It should be easy enough to see that this is no small matter. At the least, it is far
more significant than certain recent commentators would lead us to think (see
especially note 4 above). If in arguing that the aristocracy is the just regime they
do take on the task of supporting the view that somewhere sometime there could
be a c lose enough phenomenal approximat ion to the ar istocrat ic c i ty they
describe, and if the argument voiced in the Republic is in other respects what
most readings say it is, then the argument is exceedingly harder to defend than it
otherwise would be, since it is far from clear how the argument comes anywhere
close to doing the work it is supposed to do. On some of those readings, the
Republic is ult imately supposed to support the view that being just is always
more profitable for an individual person than being unjust is, and the extent to
which Socrates and his interlocutors support that view depends on the extent to
which they support the view that the aristocratic city is the just polis. By contrast,
16 The most that 473c11-e2 and 546a1-547a5 would show is that on Socrates and his interlocu-
tors' terms no aristocratic city described in the dialogue is possible unless there could be a phenome-
nal city ruled by philosophers who calculated the birth number as well as the rulers in Socrates and
his interlocutors' description do (and not that a phenomenal city would have to have also all the other
features that the closest approximation has).
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other of those interpretations can seem. to say that although the Republic is ulti-
mately meant to support both of those views, it does not have to demonstrate the
justice of the aristocratic city in order to show the superiority of being just.lT Yet
on all of these readings, obviously, the extent to which the Republic can serve its
ultimate purpose depends on the extent to which the political thesis is supported.
And even if Annas 1999,82 overstates the point, no doubt there is something to
her claim that the political proposals voiced in the Republic 
'are absurd if the
details are taken literally'. At the least, it is pretty difficult to see how the politi-
cal proposals could be carried out. At 540e5-541b1, for example, Socrates gets
Glaucon to agree that when the true philosophers become rulers (540d3-4) they
will exile everyone else over the age of ten and rear the children who remain.
Yet how could the philosopher-rulers get all those elders to leave the city?18
Without question, there can be acceptable interpretations of a Platonic dialogue
on which Plato's arguments fall short of being sound. But presumably, of course,
the arguments that an interpretation ascribes to a Platonic dialogue are supposed
to be free of major deficits-at the least, the interpretation should avoid suggest-
ing that the dialogue's author is philosophically frail. And it will not do to plead
that the claim about the aristocratic city's possibility is an extraneous or inciden-
tal feature of the argument voiced in the Republic, for in the absence of the possi-
bility requirement perhaps all that Socrates and his interlocutors should describe
is the best city conceivable.In short, the role of the possibility requirement in the
Republic poses a genuine challenge for the readings I have just mentioned.le
r7 For Kraur 1991 , 217 -218n I I the analogy between polis and psuche at 434-442 is supposed to
show what the soul's justice is: from the fact that the just polis is a city in which each part does
strictly its proper work such that reason rules the whole, it is supposed to follow that justice in the
soul consists of each part's functioning only as it should, with the reasoning part at the helm. For an
opposing v iew, see Annas l98l  ,  15 I  ,  185.
l8 Also troublesome is the view that the pupils in the aristocratic city who have been turned from
the phenomenal world to glimpse fully what is will have to be compelled to go back down into the
cave in orc ler  to ru le there (see 500d4-8,  5 l9el-520a4,520a6-9,  e| -4,521b7-11,539e2-5,540b2-5
with Brown 2004,295n25 and Brown 2000, 5-9). If the desire for a maximally happy city would not
be enough to motivate philosophers to rule in a phenomenal city like the aristocratic polls, then as
Brown 2000, l3 asks why should anyone else be sufficiently motivated to found a phenomenal
approximation to it in the first place? On another point: The view that unless we have received the
rigorous education in mathematics prescribed in the Republic we cannot recognize that the aristo-
cratic city is possible (see Brown 2000, 14n38 and Burnyeat 2000, 64) is at odds with Socrates and
his interlocutors' claim that the aristocratic city is possible. lt thus seems strange that Brown and
Burnyeat talk as if the aristocratic city's 
'practicability' is demonstrated in the dialogue.
le If I am correct, no less problematic are readings on which Socrates and his interlocutors' talk
about individualjustice is just a pretext for discussingthe politeia (see 8.7-1 1.4 of Proclus' commen-
tary on rhe Republic). The role of the possibility requirement counts decisively against the interpreta-
tion of the Republic offered by Strauss 1964,50-138. On Strauss' interpretation part of the ultimate
purpose of the Republlc is to teach readers the mistakenness of trying to build a fully just city in this
world, i.e., to purge us of the ambition to make our polis into all that a city should be (even if some
approximation of political justice is worth seeking). But on Socrates and his interlocutors' terms in
the Republic, if we envision a city which has features that appear to be the most preferable, beneficial,
or advantageous-yet we determine that a phenomenal city could not have those features-what we
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There are, then, notable implications if Socrates and his interlocutors honor the
possibility requirement. It is clear enough that they do. To make a decent case
that they do not, one has to say that the possibility requirement is cancelled at
472b3-413b3. But in that passage, Socrates and his interlocutors simply adjust
the possibility requirement somewhat, effectively leaving it intact. Even by the
dialogue's end, they act as if a city built in speech is not best unless it is possible.
It makes a significant difference for their argument whether, somewhere some-
time, there could be a close enough phenomenal approximation to the aristocratic
city built in speech.2o
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